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Abstract
The popularity of online social networks (OSNs) makes the protection of users’
private information an important but scientifically challenging problem. In the
literature, relationship-based access control schemes have been proposed to ad-
dress this problem. However, with the dynamic developments of OSNs, we
identify new access control requirements which cannot be fully captured by the
current schemes. In this paper, we focus on public information in OSNs and
treat it as a new dimension which users can use to regulate access to their re-
sources. We define a new OSN model containing users and their relationships as
well as public information. Based on this model, we introduce a variant of hy-
brid logic for formulating access control policies. We exploit a type of category
information and relationship hierarchy to further extend our logic for its usage
in practice. In the end, we propose a few solutions to address the problem of
information reliability in OSNs, and formally model collaborative access control
in our access control scheme.
Key words: Social networks, access control, privacy, hybrid logic.
1. Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are among the most popular web services
during the past ten years and have attracted a huge amount of users all over
the world. For example, Facebook, the leading OSN service, has more than one
billion active users monthly.2 OSNs are playing an important role in our daily
life by providing a platform for users to present themselves, articulate their
social circles, interact with each other etc.
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With the large amount of data maintained in OSN websites, privacy concern-
ing users’ personal information inevitably becomes an important but scientifi-
cally challenging problem. Access control schemes (e.g., see [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9])
are naturally introduced to protect users’ private information or resources in
OSNs. They can be used to guarantee that resources are only accessible by the
intended users, but not by other (possibly malicious) users. Users can control
the access to their own information or resources with access control schemes
supplied by OSNs. The existing schemes, including the ones proposed by the
research community, are mainly relationship-based, i.e., whether a user is able to
access the information depends on the relationship between him and the owner,
e.g., ‘friends’ or ‘friends of friends’.
Due to their own nature and the development of information and commu-
nications technology, OSNs admit quick and dynamic evolutions. Many new
services and methods for user interaction have emerged. For instance, users can
play online games with friends or find people who share similar interests. More
recently, with the increased popularity of GPS-enabled mobile devices, OSNs
have evolved into geo-social networks – users can tag posts and photos with their
geographical locations, find nearby friends and post check-in of some places to
share their comments. OSNs are also emerging as important social media – peo-
ple use OSNs to publish news, organize events or even seek for emergent help.
For example, Facebook and Twitter play an extremely important role during
the rescue process for the “April 2011 Fukushima earthquake”; and in summer
2014, the “Ice Bucket Challenge” have achieved a huge success through social
media.3 (In Section 3, we will take Facebook as a typical example and discuss
its developments in the past few years.)
With these evolutions, more information and activities of users are made
available in OSNs. As a result, new access control schemes are needed to capture
these new developments. Let us illustrate this need by a few scenarios in OSNs.
• Someone broke the window of Alice’s expensive car and took her purse
when she parked the car in the area of Montparnasse in Paris. Alice
publishes a status in the OSN to see if anyone can provide her some clue
to find the purse back. She doesn’t want everyone to know that she has
an expensive car, and people who live in other areas or cities won’t be
able to give her any useful information. Therefore, she intends to choose
people who live in the Montparnasse area as audiences of her status.
• Bob wants to organize a fundraising party for children’s rare diseases. He
doesn’t want to make this event public as certain sensitive information of
the participants can be leaked, e.g., it is possible that some participants’
family members may suffer from the disease. Instead, Bob only wants peo-
ple who are linked with a certain number of charities (through donations,
volunteering, etc) as him to attend the party.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Bucket_Challenge
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• Charlie has some friends who work at the rival company of his own em-
ployer. These friends invited him to attend the party organized by their
company. Charlie publishes a photo taken at the party. Apparently, it is
not a good idea for his colleagues and boss to see this photo. Thus Charlie
wants no one but his friends who work at this rival company to see it.
In relationship-based schemes, a resource owner cannot exploit any other in-
formation but user relationships between him and the requester when defining
access control policies. Therefore, the above requirements cannot be fully and
precisely formulated in the current schemes proposed in the literature.
Contributions and Outline. In order to solve the identified problems, we
propose a new access control scheme for OSNs. We focus on public information
existing, e.g., in Facebook (Section 3), and show that it can be used to group
users based on their attributes, common interests and activities. Public infor-
mation can thus be considered as a new dimension for users to regulate access
to their resources. As a consequence, we propose a new OSN model contain-
ing both a user graph and a public information graph (Section 4). We then
extend a hybrid logic [10] to express this type of access control policies (Sec-
tion 5). The expressiveness of our scheme is extensively discussed through a
number of real-life scenarios (Section 6). We further identify two special seman-
tic relations, i.e., category relation among public information and relationship
hierarchy, which allow us to express certain types of policies in a concise way
(Section 7 and Section 8). To address the problem of information reliability
in OSNs, we propose to add endorsement and trust into our policy formulas
(Section 9). In addition, we formally model the collaborative access control in
Section 10 within our new access control scheme.
After the introduction, we give a brief overview of related work in Section 2.
Section 11 compares our access control scheme with existing schemes in the
literature. We discuss several issues related to our scheme in Section 12 and
conclude our paper with some future work in Section 13.
2. Related Work
Relationship-based access control, driven by OSNs, was first advocated in [11]
and defined as an access control paradigm based on interpersonal relation-
ships. Carminati et al. proposed the first relationship-based access control model
in [12], where the relationships between the qualified requester and the owner
are interpreted into three aspects, i.e., relationship type, depth and trust level.
In [13], the authors used semantic web technology including OWL and SWRL to
extend the model of [12]. They also proposed administrative and filtering poli-
cies which can be used for collaborative and supervising access control, respec-
tively. Fong et al. proposed an access control scheme for Facebook-style social
networks [14], in which they model the access control procedure as two stages.
In the first stage, the requester has to find the owner of the target resource; then
in the second stage, the owner decides whether the authorization is granted or
not. Their access control policies are mainly based on the relationships between
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the requester and the owner. Moreover, they proposed several meaningful access
control policies based on the graph structure of OSNs, such as n-common friends
and clique. In [15], Fong introduced a modal logic to define access control poli-
cies for OSNs. Later Fong and Siahaan [16] improved the previously proposed
logic to further support policies like n-common friends and clique. In [10], the
authors adopted a hybrid logic to describe policies which eliminates an exponen-
tial penalty in expressing complex relationships such as n-common friends. This
hybrid logic is expressive and has been adopted by several other works [17, 18, 19]
for specifying access control policies. A visualization tool for evaluating the ef-
fect of access control configurations is designed in [20], with which a user can
check which other users within a certain distance to him can view his resources.
Cheng et al. proposed a rich OSN model in [21]. In their work, not only users
but also resources are treated as entities and actions performed by users are
considered as relationships in OSNs. As more information are incorporated in
their model, many new access control policies can be expressed (more details
can be found in Section 11). Their model supports administrative and filtering
policies as proposed in [13]. Recently, Crampton and Sellwood [22] general-
ized relationship-based access control to other systems than social networks,
they proposed path logic conditions for specifying policies and adopt principle
matching for policy evaluation. Besides models, several security protocols based
on cryptographic techniques are proposed to enforce relationship-based access
control policies, e.g., see [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31].
As a shared platform, resources in OSNs may be co-owned by a number of
users. Thus, collaborative access control also plays an essential role in protect-
ing privacy. A game theoretical method based on the Clarke-Tax mechanism
for collective privacy management was proposed by Siquicciarini et al. [32]. Sun
et al. proposed a different approach by combining trust relations in OSNs and
preferential voting schemes [33, 34]. Ahn et al. introduced a multiparty access
control model in [35]. In addition, they developed a policy specification scheme
and a voting based conflict resolution mechanism. Photo tagging is the most
common service relevant to collaborative access control. The authors of [36, 37]
have investigated users’ privacy concerns about this service and proposed prin-
ciples for designing better collaborative access control schemes. Besides interac-
tion, users’ private information can be leaked through third party applications.
A privacy-by-proxy design for social network APIs was developed by Felt and
Evans [38]. Singh et al. [39] proposed a privacy-preserved application platform,
i.e., xBook, which integrates information flow model to control what applica-
tions can do with users’ information. An access control scheme for third party
applications was developed [40], where applications are required to adapt users’
specifications on their own data.
3. Motivation
An OSN provides users with some typical services, such as users can build
their profiles and establish social relationships with each other. Moreover, an
OSN also provides a platform for users to socialize and interact with each other.
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In the following, we first give a brief overview of the developments of Facebook
– one of the most popular OSN services in the world. After that, we discuss
public information in Facebook and its potential usage in access control.
3.1. Facebook
In Facebook, each user is affiliated with a personal profile that contains
his basic information (e.g., age, gender and nationality), work and education
background, living places and so on. A user’s hobbies (e.g., sports, movies and
music) are articulated in ‘Likes’; places he has been to are marked in ‘Map’.
Besides personal representation, Facebook also allows a user to establish friend
relations with others. In addition, Facebook recommends friends for users based
on common friends, same hometown or similar interests. A user can organize
his friends into different groups, or named friend list. Moreover, Facebook also
automatically create lists (smart list) for users based on their work, living area,
school and family.
Facebook is not only a website storing users’ personal information and social
relations, but also a platform for users to interact with each other. A user can
directly communicate with his friends by sending messages; he can tag his friends
in photos and posts. Two friends can interact through Facebook applications
such as games. All activities performed by a user are organized chronologically
in his ‘Timeline’ through which other users as well as the user himself can check
his past activities conveniently. A user receives his friends’ news on ‘Newsfeed’.
When he finds something interesting, he can further perform actions, such as
‘like’, ‘share’ and ‘comment’, on it. Users on Facebook can also establish public
groups and organize events such as birthday parties, meetings and conferences,
and invite other users to attend, like or share these groups or events.
In January 2013, Facebook publishes a new product called Graph Search,
a search engine based on users’ data.4 It allows users to explore more informa-
tion about daily life, find people who share common interests or live in the same
city, discover new restaurants and music, and so on. Through Graph Search,
a user can directly acquire information from his friends’ data without visiting
their personal pages. For example, if a user types in “photos by my friends”,
he will get a page containing all photos uploaded by his friends. Since Graph
Search is a personalized search engine, for the same query different users will
get different results.
When a user wants to publish or share a resource (a photo or a post), Face-
book provides him an audience selector to let him decide who can view this
resource. This audience selector is the access control implementation of Face-
book and it supports five different modes including ‘public’, ‘friends’, ‘friends
except acquaintances’, ‘only me’ and ‘custom’. In the last mode, a user can
choose the eligible requester to be (or not to be) a single user or a specific group
(through friend list). The selector also supports smart lists in Facebook, which
group a user’s friends according to ‘work’, ‘school’, ‘family’ and ‘city’ using the
4https://www.facebook.com/about/graphsearch
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information added to the ‘Education’ and ‘Work’ and ‘Current City’ sections of
their profile.
3.2. Public Information and Access Control
Besides users’ information, Facebook imports knowledge of external sources,
e.g., Wikipedia and Bing map, into its system to formalize another type of en-
tities. We name them public information. A lot of entities in the real world
are modeled as public information, e.g., countries, history events or public fig-
ures. Public information are mainly used as common reference points of users’
information, through which a user can find other users in Facebook with sim-
ilar background, hobbies, experiences, etc. For example, a user can find his
schoolmates through the public information of the college that he has attended.
Each public information is affiliated with a content that is normally extracted
from external sources. Similar to users, public information are also connected
with each other and links among them are based on their contents. For example,
if Wikipedia articles of two charities are connected, then their public information
in Facebook are connected as well. Besides, there exist many different links
between users and public information. Some of these connections are based on
user profiles, e.g., if a user specifies his employer in his profile, then he is linked
with this employer’s public information. Others are computed by Facebook
through mining users’ data. For example, if a user posts a status labeled with
a location, then the user is connected with the location’s public information.
In addition to facilitate users’ interaction, it is possible to use public informa-
tion in expressing access control requirements. For example, in the first scenario
as discussed in Section 1, the requester has to be linked to the location where
the car was parked; in the second one, the requester needs to be linked with
the owner through some charity organizations; in the third one, the requester
is asked to be connected with the owner through not only a friendship but also
their employers’ connection. Here, the location, charities as well as companies
can all be modeled as public information in OSNs.
All the above access control requirements are meaningful and in line with
the recent developments of OSNs. However, the current access control schemes
proposed in the literature mainly focus on relationships among users, public
information are not taken into account. On the other hand, Facebook already
allows users to define policies with some simple public information. As shown
in Figure 1, a user can define a policy to allow users who lives in the same area
or work at the same university as him to view his photo through smart lists.
However, this function is still ad hoc, scenarios proposed in Section 1 cannot be
fully captured. Therefore, in this paper we propose a new access control scheme,
in which policies can be expressed based on both users and public information,
and their relationships.
4. A Model of Online Social Networks
Our OSN model contains information of (1) users and their social relation-
ships, (2) public information and their connections, and (3) links between users
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Figure 1: Access control with smart list in Facebook.
and public information. Public information and users are essentially two dif-
ferent concepts – public information are imported from external databases (in
most cases), and they cannot perform actions and establish relationships with
each other as users; relationships among public information are also extracted
from external sources. Therefore, we treat public information and users sepa-
rately. We model an OSN as a tuple (UG,PG, ρ, %). A user graph is denoted by
UG, and it depicts users and their relationships. A public information graph is
denoted by PG, which represents all public information and connections among
them. Two maps, i.e., ρ and %, store links between users and public information.
4.1. User Graph
The set U contains all users in an OSN. Each user is affiliated with some
basic information which are treated as attributes of the user. We use UR =
{α1, α2, . . . , αk} to denote a (finite) set of relationship types supported in the
OSN. The semantics of each relationship type is defined as αi ⊆ U × U . If user
ua is in a αi relationship with user ub, then we write (ua, ub) ∈ αi. For each
relationship type αi ∈ UR, there exists its reverse relationship type, e.g., if αi
stands for husbandof , then its reverse is wifeof . We use α−1i ∈ UR to denote the
reverse of αi. Moreover, if αi = α
−1
i , then αi is a symmetric relationship, e.g.,
friend is a typical symmetric relationship. User graph UG is a directed graph
denoted as (U ,UE), where every user in the OSN is a node and the set of edges,
i.e., UE , is defined as {(ua, ub, αi) | ua, ub ∈ U and (ua, ub) ∈ αi}.
4.2. Public Information Graph
As we introduced in Section 3, public information are also linked as to-
gether, such as Paris is linked with France. Therefore, we model public infor-
mation as a graph. We use the set P to denote all public information that
are extracted from external databases, such as Wikipedia and some geography
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Figure 2: A sample OSN model.
databases (such as Bing). Each public information fc has its own attributes.
We use PR = {β1, β2, . . . , β`} to denote a (finite) set of relationship types on
public information. Each relationship type βj can be semantically defined as
βj ⊆ P×P. If βj ’s reverse relationship type exists, it is denoted by β−1j . Public
information graph is formally denoted as PG = (P,PE), where P is the set of
nodes and PE is defined as {(fc, fd, βj) | fc, fd ∈ P and (fc, fd) ∈ βj}.
4.3. Links between UG and PG
There are a lot of links between users and public information. For example,
a user is linked with the language he speaks and the city he lives in. As the
OSN is modeled as UG and PG, we define two maps, i.e., ρ and %, between them
to describe their connections:
ρ : U → 2P and % : P → 2U .
For a user ua ∈ U , ρ(ua) is a subset of the nodes in PG that are related to ua.
The map ρ(ua) may contain a lot of different types of public information, such
as museums, universities, pop stars, etc, which are computed by the OSN with
the information that ua provides. For a public information fc ∈ P, %(fc) gives
all the users in UG who have been involved in activities or have information
related to fc. How to compute ρ and % is not the focus of this paper, we assume
that ρ and % always give us the right results. In practice, it is desirable to have
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more fine-grained links between users and public information. With respect to
this, the two maps ρ and % can be further refined to reflect how precisely a user
and a piece of public information is connected.
4.4. An Example
A sample OSN model is shown in Figure 2, whose left side is a UG and right
side is a PG. Edges in the graph with double arrows imply that the relationships
are symmetric.5 For example, Alice and Bob are friends; Company A and
Company B are rivals. The dash lines between users and public information
reflect the links between UG and PG, which are formally captured by the two
maps ρ and %. (The part contained in the dashed box in the right-bottom corner
will be discussed in Section 7.)
5. A Hybrid Logic
In [10], a hybrid logic is used to define access control policies for OSNs. We
adopt their logic and additionally introduce a new type of formulas ψ. With
such formulas, we can define policies based on information in PG. Moreover, two
new logic operators, i.e.,  and , are introduced to connect formulas on UG
and PG, respectively. In this way, we can combine resources and their relations
from both UG and PG to specify new and expressive access control policies (see
examples in Section 6).
5.1. Syntax
The syntax of our hybrid logic is given below, and its semantics will be
discussed in the next section.
s ::= m | x
t ::= n | y
φ ::= s | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈αi〉φ | #sφ | Oxφ | ψ
ψ ::= t | q | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | 〈βj〉ψ |  tψ | Hyψ | φ
In our logic, there are mainly two types of formulas: the user formulas φ manip-
ulate information on the user graph UG, while the public information formulas
ψ are defined on PG. Three kinds of atoms are supported in our logic, i.e.,
nominals (m and n), variables (x and y) and proposition symbols (p and q).
Nominal m represents the name of a user in UG, e.g., Alice, while n represents
the name of a public information in PG, e.g., Paris. Propositional symbol p is
used for specifying the attributes of users in U and similarly q is used for public
information in P. For example, p (i.e., IsMale) can specify users who are male
and q (i.e., IsCity) can specify those publication information representing a city.
Atoms m, x and p are used in user formulas φ, while n, y and q are used in
5 For the sake of simplicity, we omit some edges in the figure, e.g., the edge from Danny
and Eve to represent the relationship ‘husbandof’.
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public information formulas ψ. Negation ¬ and conjunction ∧ have their usual
meanings and can be used to define disjunction ∨. Therefore, we also use ∨ in
both φ and ψ. 〈αi〉 and 〈βj〉 are two modal logic operators. As described in
Section 4, symbols αi and βj represent the relationship types in UG and PG,
respectively. Hybrid logic operator # can be used either with a nominal or vari-
able, while O can only operate on variables. The same holds for  and H. Two
new logic operators, i.e.,  and , are used to connect the two types of formulas
φ and ψ together. They allow the specification of access control policies based
on both information from the user graph and the public information graph.
5.2. Semantics
Our model for evaluating access control policy formulas contains six parts,
i.e., Γ,∆, ρ, %, cur n, τ , where Γ = (UG, VU ) and ∆ = (PG, VP ). VU is a map
between atoms (either m or p) and users in UG, VU (m) is a set that contains
only one user in UG whose name is m and VU (p) is a set of users that have
the attribute as specified by p. For example, VU (Alice) refers to a singleton
containing the node of Alice in UG. Similarly, we can define VP (n) and VP (q).
As introduced in Section 4, ρ and % maintained by the OSN connect users and
public information. Node cur n refers to either a user ua in UG or a public
information fc in PG. Valuation τ stores all the maps from variables in the
policy formula to vertices in either UG or PG. When there is a new map from
x to ua (y to fc) added to τ , we write τ [x 7→ ua] (τ [y 7→ fc]).
We use satisfaction relation Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ to describe the meaning of
user formula φ.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  x iff ua = τ(x)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  m iff VU (m) = {ua}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  p iff ua ∈ VU (p)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  ¬φ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ 2 φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ1 ∧ Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ2
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉φ iff ∃ub ∈ U s.t. (ua, ub) ∈ αi ∧ Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  #mφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ where VU (m) = {ub}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  #xφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, τ(x), τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  Oxφ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ [x 7→ ua]  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  ψ iff ∃fc ∈ ρ(ua) s.t. Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ
The first three relations express the meaning of atoms. When φ is a single
variable x, it holds if and only if when τ contains a map from x to ua. If φ is
a single nominal or propositional symbol, it is true if and only if when ua is in
the set defined by VU . When several modal logic operators (〈αi〉) are aligned
sequentially in a formula, they can represent a relationship path, e.g., user can
define a policy to regulate that only ‘friends of friends’ can access his resource.
The hybrid logic operator #sφ jumps to the node that s refers to in UG, and
Oxφ adds a map from x to ua into τ . The new operator, i.e., ψ, links a user
formula φ with a public information formula ψ – it maps the current node ua
in UG to a set of public information in PG that are related to this user. If there
is one public information in ρ(ua) satisfying ψ, then the formula ψ holds.
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In the following, we give the meaning of public information formulas ψ.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  y iff fc = τ(y)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  n iff VP (n) = {fc}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  q iff fc ∈ VP (q)
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ¬ψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ 2 ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ1 ∧ Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ2
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  〈βj〉ψ iff ∃fd ∈ Ps.t.(fc, fd) ∈ βj ∧ Γ,∆, ρ, %, fd, τ  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ   nψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fd, τ  ψ where VP (n) = {fd}
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ   yψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, τ(y), τ  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  Hyψ iff Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ [y 7→ fc]  ψ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  φ iff ∃ua ∈ %(fc) s.t.Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ
It is easy to find that the semantics of public information formulas resembles
the user formulas. Therefore, information in PG can be used in access control
policies in a same way as in UG. When the evaluation process encounters the
operator φ, the public information node fc is mapped to users that are related
to it in UG. If φ holds at one of these users, then the formula φ is true.
Note that, by combing the user formula ψ with propositions, we can link
a user to a more specific set of public information. We write qψ for (q ∧ ψ)
and its meaning can be reinterpreted as:
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  qψ iff ∃fc ∈ ρ(ua) ∩ VP (q) s.t. Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  ψ
Similarly, we can define pφ as (p ∧ φ) and formulate its semantics.
5.3. Expressing Access Control Policies
In general, there are four elements in an access control scenario, i.e., a re-
quester, a target, an action and access control policies. More precisely, the
requester tries to perform an action on the target, whether he succeeds or not
depends on the access control policies defined for the target.
• Owner and requester. Both the owner and requester are users in the
social network, and we use free variables own and req to represent the
owner of the resource and the requester in the formula.
• Target. With multiple services supported by the OSN, a target can be
a user or a resource. For example, a requester can request to chat with a
user or view one of his photo. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
the target can only be a resource owned by some user.
• Access control policies. Normally, a user can define an access control
policy for the resources that he owns. But in some cases, the access of
a resource is decided by several users. For example, for a photo that is
tagged with several users, each of them should have the right to decide
who can view this photo. This is the subject of collaborative (or multi-
party) access control management, e.g., see [21, 32, 33, 34, 35]. For now,
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we assume that a resource is attached with only one access control policy
that is defined by its owner. In Section 10, we will show how to support
collaborative access control within our access control scheme.
• Action. As introduced in Section 3, a user can perform multiple actions
in OSNs, such as ‘view’, ‘comment’, ‘tag’ and ‘share’. The only action
we consider here is ‘view’ and other actions are affiliated with it, i.e.,
when a user is able to view a resource published by another user, he can
comment or share it as well.
In OSNs, both the requester and the owner are users. We restrict that an
access control formula has to start with either an owner or a requester, i.e.,
policy formulas are in the form either #ownφ or #reqφ.
5.4. Model Checking
Given an OSN model (UG,PG, ρ, %) and an access control policy expressed
in our hybrid logic as a formula φ, the satisfaction of Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  φ with
τ [own 7→ ua, req 7→ ub], Γ = (UG, VU ) and ∆ = (PG, VP ) is formulated as a local
model checking problem by Bruns et al. [10]. Except for the user graph UG,
our OSN model captures public information and their relationships. Moreover,
our logic essentially extends the one of [10] with public information formulas ψ
defined on PG and two new operators  and  connecting user formulas and
public information formulas. In principle, we can reuse the model checking algo-
rithm of Bruns et al. [10]. As formulas of the form ψ′ or φ′ explore the links
between UG and PG, we need to treat them differently. A formula ψ′ maps
the current node (cur n) in UG to a a set of public information in PG. As long
as there is one public information in ρ(cur n) satisfying ψ, then φ holds. The
formula φ′ is defined similarly. To check them, we can develop a sub-routine
similar to MCmay of Bruns et al. [10], which first computes the set of all public
information (users) related to a specific user (public information) and then iter-
ate through the set until one of them makes the connected formula ψ′ (φ′) hold
on PG (UG). For formulas (q ∧ ψ′) and (p ∧ φ′) as discussed in Section 5,
we can further reduce the size of the computed set by using propositions p and
q to improve the efficiency in model checking.
6. Example Policies
In order to show the expressiveness of our new scheme based on the OSN
model, we design several real-life scenarios and give their corresponding formulas
in our logic. We use the OSN model depicted in Figure 2, and we assume that
valuation g contains two maps own 7→ uo and req 7→ ur, where uo, ur ∈ U are
the owner and the requester, respectively.
Scenario 0. We first show how to express the policy related to user relation-
ships. Suppose that Eve defines a policy on a certain resource to regulate that
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the qualified requesters can only be her friends or friends of friends. The policy
formula can be written as follows:
#own(〈friend〉req ∨ 〈friend〉〈friend〉req).
The hybrid logic operator #own drives the formula to start at Eve. The require-
ment “friends of friends” is achieved by aligning 〈friend〉 twice which forms
a relationship path of length two. In Figure 2, Bob, Frank and Gabriele can
view the resource because they are friends of Eve, Alice is also eligible since she
is one of Eve’s friends of friends.
To restrict the access to the photo, except for her friends, Eve regulates that
the qualified requester should have at least three common friends with her. The
policy formula is written as
#own(〈friend〉req ∨ 〈friend〉3req).
This is the ‘n-common friends’ – one of the topology-based access control poli-
cies defined in [14] – 〈friend〉3 expresses ‘at least three different friends’ in the
formula. In [10], the authors show how to implement this policy with the logic
operators Ox and #s, we omit the details here. In Figure 2, as Alice has three
common friends with Eve, she can still view the photo.
Next, we illustrate the usage of public information by defining access control
policies for four different scenarios. In the first scenario, public information are
used to describe an attribute of the qualified requester. While in the second
and third scenarios, the owner and the requester are linked through public
information. In addition, the third scenario needs the owner and the requester
to be connected through the user relationship as well. In the fourth scenario
(not discussed in Section 1), the owner and the requester are linked through a
path composed by both users and public information.
Scenario 1. Let us recall the first access control scenario discussed in Section 1,
which exploits the information in PG. Alice publishes a status to find a witness
who lives in or visited the area where her car was broken into, i.e., Montparnasse
in Figure 2. The policy is formulated as
#req Montparnasse.
The operator  links UG with PG, as introduced in Section 5, we can useIsLocation to make the map more precisely. Montparnasse in the formula is a
nominal, VP (Montparnasse) is the node that represents Montparnasse in PG.
Here, the requester’s connection with Montparnasse can be treated as one of his
attributes.
In order to get more information, Alice may enlarge the searching area to the
whole city, i.e., Paris in Figure 2. We assume that a user can only be linked to a
place’s public information, but not to a city’s public information. For example,
a user’s photo can be labeled with any street or square of a city, but not the
city itself. The policy can then be written as
#req IsLocation 〈is-in〉Paris.
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Here, 〈is-in〉 represents a 1-depth relationship path in PG. Depending on the
policy, the length of the path can be arbitrary. Note that the requester’s con-
nection with Paris can be also formalized as an attribute. However, in this way,
each user will be affiliated with a huge number of attributes in the model which
may not be an ideal solution.
Scenario 2. In this scenario (the second one in Section 1), Bob wants to use
the OSN to organize a fundraising party for children’s rare diseases. He intends
to let people who are affiliated with at least a certain number, such as three, of
different charities as himself to access the event page. The policy is defined as
follows. #own IsCharity Hy1  (req∧#own IsCharity Hy2(¬y1 ∧(req∧#own IsCharity Hy3(¬y1 ∧ ¬y2 ∧req))))
The left part of Figure 3 depicts an example of three charities (‘UNICEF’,
‘Red Cross’ and ‘SOS Children’s Villages’) in PG needed between a qualified
requester and Bob. It can be thought as a public information version of ‘3-
common friends’ policy in UG. Three variables, i.e., y1, y2 and y3, mark three
charities that Bob is linked with; the conjunction of their negative forms, i.e.,
¬y1 and ¬y1 ∧ ¬y2, in the formula makes sure that these three charities are
different.
With our logic, more complicated policies can be achieved based on the
information of PG. Suppose that Bob wants to organize another fundraising
party for homeless children in Syria during its current civil war. For security
and privacy reasons, he believes that the qualified requesters to attend this
event should be people who are linked with at least two charities as he is, such
as ‘UNICEF’ and ‘Red Cross’, that are involved in the humanity aid in Syria
organized by the United Nations, i.e., ‘Unocha.Syria’ in PG,6. The policy is
defined as
#own  Hy1〈donate〉Hy5(Unocha.Syria ∧ 〈donate−1〉Hy3  (req ∧#own  Hy2(¬y1 ∧ 〈donate〉(y5 ∧ 〈donate−1〉Hy4(¬y3 ∧req )))))
The connections between the requester and Bob are shown in the right part of
Figure 3. Variables y1 and y2 mark two different charities; so do y3 and y4 for
the requester. We notice that the charities that Bob is related to need not to be
different from the ones of the requester. Variable y5 guarantees that all these
organizations have contributions to ‘Unocha.Syria’.
Since the public information and their relationships are extracted from ex-
ternal sources, complicated relationship paths in PG as shown in this example
give rise to more meaningful and expressive access control policies.
Scenario 3. In the third scenario in Section1, Charlie only allows his friends
who work in the rival company of his employer to view his photo. The policy is
6http://syria.unocha.org/
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Figure 3: Connections between Bob and qualified requesters.
formally defined as below:
#own(〈friend〉req ∧ (〈rival〉 req)).
Different from policies in the previous scenarios, this one requires that the owner
and the requester are linked through information in both UG and PG. More
precisely, the sub-formula 〈rival〉 regulates that the qualified requester need
to work for Company B’s rival, i.e., Company A; and the sub-formula 〈friend〉
filters out the requester who is not a friend of Charlie. We use a conjunction
symbol to combine these two parts. In Figure 2, only Alice is qualified as she is
a friend of Charlie and she works for Company A.
Scenario 4. In the fourth scenario, suppose that Bob wants to organize another
fundraising event, and he wants to invite people who used to participate in the
same charities as him and their friends to attend the event. The policy formula
is specified as below:
#own IsCharity (req ∨ 〈friend〉req).
In Figure 2, Alice is invited to participate this event since she is linked with
Bob through a charity (UNICEF). Moreover, Frank, Gabriele and Charlie can
also receive the invitation due to their friendships with Alice. Here, the path
that links Frank (as well as Gabriele and Charlie) and Bob is composed by both
public information and users in the social network model.
7. Using Category Relation in Access Control
In this section, we explore the category relation among public information
and incorporate it in our hybrid logic for the aim of concisely specifying access
control policies based on public information.
7.1. The Category Relation in Public Information Graph
Let us first consider another scenario. In the model depicted in Figure 2,
Charlie is linked with several kinds of sports including Basketball and Tennis.
Alice is also a sport fan and her favorite one is Tennis, while Danny likes Vol-
leyball. Charlie has a photo depicting him playing tennis. He only wants his
friends who are linked with Tennis to view it. The policy can be defined as
#own〈friend〉(req ∧ (Tennis)).
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Since Alice likes Tennis, she can view the photo. Now, Charlie decides to relax
the restriction such that the qualified requester should be his friend who likes
any kinds of sports. He modifies his policy as follows:
#own〈friend〉(req ∧(〈is-a〉Sports)).
Relationship path 〈is-a〉 in the formula marks all the public information that are
in an is-a relation with Sports in PG, e.g., Tennis. However, this policy cannot
achieve Charlie’s goal. For example, Danny is not able to view this photo even
he is supposed to be. This is because Volleyball is not linked with Sports but
Team Sports in is-a relationship as shown in Figure 2. In order to grant access
to Danny, Charlie again modifies the policy as follows:
#own〈friend〉(req ∧(〈is-a〉Sports ∨ 〈is-a〉〈is-a〉Sports)).
However, there exists many public information related to Sports in the OSN
and defining a policy by enumerating all possible lengths is not an acceptable
solution. In Wikipedia, articles are organized by means of categories and all the
categories form an acyclic graph. Figure 4 shows a part of the category graph of
Wikipedia.7 An article is under (at least) one category, some article can be the
main article of a category. For example, article basketball is under the category
team sports, it is also the main article of the category basketball. An article
under a category is linked with the category’s main article. Actually, this is the
is-a relationship among public information in PG, we call it category relation.
Since all categories of Wikipedia form an acyclic group (category graph), public
information together with is-a relationships among them compose an acyclic
graph as well. For example, the subgraph in the dashed box in Figure 2 is a
tree. Next, we integrate the category relation into our logic formula to express
above policies in a concise way.
7.2. Logic with the Category Relation
In the model depicted in Figure 2, Charlie is linked with several kinds of
sports including Basketball and Tennis. Alice is also a sport fan and her favorite
one is Tennis, while Danny likes Volleyball. Charlie has a photo that he wants
to share with all his friends who like sports. As depicted in the dash box of
Figure 2, these kind of public information are organized by categories. Instead
of defining a policy to specify all the sports that are linked to users, we can
directly use these category information to define policies.
To make use of the category relations among public information, We first
introduce a function on PG and a new symbol in our logic. The function cf is
formally defined as
cf({fc}) =
{ {fc} @fd s.t. (fd, fc) ∈ is-a⋃
cf({fd}) ∀fd s.t. (fd, fc) ∈ is-a
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Categories
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Figure 4: Part of the category hierarchy of Wikipedia.
The result of cf({fc}) contains fc and all its descendants in an acyclic graph
based on is-a relationships in PG.
In our hybrid logic, nominal n can represent name of any public information
in PG. In order to refer to the node named n as well as all its descendants in the
formula, we add a category nominal bnc into our logic. The syntax of formulas
ψ is extended as follows:
ψ ::= t | bnc | q | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | 〈j〉ψ |  tψ | Hyψ | φ.
The semantics of bnc is
Γ,∆, ρ, %, fc, τ  bnc iff fc ∈ cf(VP (n))
⋃
VP (n).
With the category nominal, Charlie can easily redefine his policy in the
previous example as
#own〈friend〉(req ∧bSportsc).
Now, all friends of Charlie who are related to any kind of sport activities, such
as Alice and Danny, can access the photo.
Similar to the ones with their contents from Wikipedia, public information
from geography databases, i.e., places, together with is-in relationships among
them also naturally compose an acyclic graph. Therefore, we are able to define
policies to qualify the requester, such as “only my friends who have ever been to
Europe”, in a concise way without listing different length of is-in relationship
paths in PG. Other types of hierarchical relationships on public information
can also be investigated for the same purpose.
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Figure 5: Access control with close friends acquaintances and restricted in Facebook.
8. Relationship Hierarchy
In this section, we extend our hybrid logic to capture the hierarchy among
different relationships, enabling policy propagation in our access control scheme.
8.1. Relationship Hierarchy
Our social graph model supports multi-relationships. As depicted in Fig-
ure 2, Gabriele and Danny are brothers and Alice and Danny are schoolmates.
In general, different relationships have different social strength. Family-related
relationships, such as spouse and parents, are normally considered stronger than
professional relationships such as colleagues. When an owner allows others who
are in a certain relationship with him to view one of his resources, those who are
in a stronger relationships with the owner intuitively should be able to access
the resource as well. For example, if Alice allows her colleagues to view her
education background, then her husband and parents should also be able to see
it.
In our hybrid logic, to express this kinds of policy, we can define a formula for
each relationship type and connect these formulas together with the disjunction
operator ∨. The policy formula for the above example in our hybrid logic can
be specified as
#own〈colleague〉req ∨#own〈wifeof 〉req ∨#own〈childof 〉req.
However, this solution is not ideal since it requires the owner to specify the policy
for all the intended relationships one by one. It is very likely that the owner
misses some relationships, thus the policy cannot fully capture his intention.
Therefore, we need a straightforward way to let the owner only specify one
relationship in the policy and all the users who are in a stronger relationship
with him can access the resource directly. In fact, Facebook already allows a
18
user to put his friends into three (smart) friend lists including “close friend”,
“acquaintances” and “restricted” based on their social strength. However, as
depicted in Figure 5, a Facebook user still needs to specify these lists in the
audience selector (see Section 3) to control who can view his resource, i.e., access
control based on social strength is not implemented automatically in Facebook.
To express this kinds of policies in the hybrid logic, we first need to define a
hierarchy on all the relationships supported by the OSN. This hierarchy can be
built at a system level or a user level. At a system level, OSN operators could
regulate the order of relationship types with respect to their social strength. On
the other hand, different users may have different opinions about the strength
of the relationships. For example, some users believe that college friends are
more important than colleagues from work while some have the opposite opinion.
Therefore, OSNs could delegate this right to each user and let them freely define
the relationship hierarchies themselves.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we simply assume that the relationship
hierarchy is defined at a system level. This indicates that all users in the OSN
will share the same relationship hierarchy. The definition of the relationship
hierarchy is given as follows.
Definition 1. A relationship hierarchy is defined as (UR,≤), where UR =
{α1, α2, . . . , αk} is the relationship type set and ≤ is a binary relationship on
UR which is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
By its definition, a relationship hierarchy is a partially ordered set. For
two relationship types, α1 ≤ α2 indicates that α2 is a closer relationship than
α1. Figure 6 gives an example of the hierarchy. In this example, spouse is
considered the strongest relationship followed by close friends and family. Note
that the actual strength of the relationships is out of the scope of this work,
OSN operators can follow any theory from the area of sociology to construct
the relationship hierarchy.
8.2. Logic with Relationship Hierarchy
To exploit the information in relationship hierarchy to specify our access
control policies, we introduce a new symbol d〈αi〉eφ into our syntax. The syntax
of the user formula is extended to:
s ::= m | x
φ ::= s | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈αi〉φ | d〈αi〉eφ | #sφ | Oxφ | ψ.
The semantics of d〈αi〉eφ is defined below.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  d〈αi〉eφ iff ∃ ub ∈ U s.t. (ua, ub) ∈ αj where αi ≤ αj
∧ Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
Here, ub can be in any relationship that is at least the same level of αi with ua
defined in the relationship hierarchy. To evaluate the policy, the relationship
hierarchy should be included in the model Γ as well.
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Figure 6: A relationship hierarchy example.
Example 1. Now, with the new operator, an owner could define a policy
regulating that users who are at least his colleagues can view one of his resource
as #ownd〈colleague〉ereq.
In addition, the hierarchy operator can be aligned together to express relation-
ship path as well. For example, the following policy means that the requester
has to be 3-depth away from the owner and the relationship on each step has
to be at least colleague:
#ownd〈colleague〉ed〈colleague〉ed〈colleague〉ereq.
Example 2. To give another example on how to use the hierarchical relation-
ships, recall the social network depicted in Figure 2, suppose that Danny wants
to share his interest, such as Volleyball, with his friends. It is clear from Figure 2
that only Charlie can view the information. If Danny intends to share it with
users who are also in stronger relationships with him, e.g., Eve (his wife) and
Gabriele (his brother), then the policy without using relationship hierarchy will
be defined below, where Danny has to explicitly enumerate all the relationships
that he considers stronger than freind:
#own〈friend〉req ∨#own〈husbandof 〉req ∨#own〈brotherof 〉req.
Now, given the extended logic that supports hierarchical information, Danny
could simply redefine the policy in a more concise way:
#ownd〈friend〉ereq.
Moreover, if Danny considers schoolmate a stronger relationship than friend
which is different from the hierarchy presented in Figure 6, then Alice can
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access the resource as well. In this case, instead of using the system level
relationship hierarchy, Danny could define his own relationship hierarchy with
friend ≤ schoolmate specified. In general, with the extension, our logic can
support any hierarchical relationships when defining access control policies.
The main difference between relationship hierarchy and category relationship
introduced in Section 7 is the following: relationship hierarchy is defined on
relationships, it can only grant access to users who are at the certain distance
(specified in the policy) but in different relationships with the owner; on the
other hand, category relationship is defined on the nodes in public information
graph and it can represent paths of different length in a policy (through the
recursively defined function cf({fc})). Further combination of the category
relation and relationship hierarchy can be achieved as well, which will give rise
to a more powerful way to specify complicated policies in a simple form.
Example 3. To give an example, in Figure 2, suppose that Bob wants to or-
ganize a fundraising event, he plans to invite all users who have involved in any
fundraising event for Syria before, and their friends (or stronger relationships
than friends). This policy exploits both category information related to public
information graph and relationship hierarchy related to social graph. By com-
bining the two extensions we have proposed, Bob can simply define the policy
as #own  bUnocha.Syriac (req ∨ dfriendereq).
In Figure 2, Alice and Eve can see the invitation since they are directly involved
in some fundraising events (through category relationship). Besides, Frank,
Gabirele and Charlie as friends of Alice can join as well. Due to the power
of relationship hierarchy, Danny can access the information since he is Eve’s
husband (following the relationship hierarchy in Figure 6). On the other hand,
without the extensions related to category and relationship hierarchy, to define
a policy like this, Bob’s policy formula will become much longer. We conclude
that both extensions improve the concision of our access control scheme.
9. Information Reliability
Owners define policies to control access to their resources. However, in some
cases, if the information in OSNs are not reliable, malicious users can still gain
access to some resources that they are not supposed to under certain policies.
For example, in Scenario 0 of Section 6, If an adversary is able to become
friends with three friends of Eve, then he is able to gain the access. Similarly
in Scenario 3 of Section 6, a colleague of Charlie, who is also his friend, can
maliciously specify that he works for the rival company in the OSN to access
Charlie’s sensitive photo. As introduced in Section 4, our OSN model contains
three parts, i.e., UG, PG and two maps ρ and %. We discuss about their reliability
one by one.
Reliability of UG. Information contained in UG are mainly users and their
relationships. Since a user can describe who he is in the OSN, we only focus on
users relationships. To increase user relationships’ reliability, we explore trust.
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In contrast to the real life, trust between users in OSNs can be quantified, i.e.,
it has a value. We first add trust values into UG. When ua establishes an αi
relationship with ub, ua will assign a trust value t
αi
ab to this relationship. The
edge from ua to ub is then defined as (ua, ub, αi, t
αi
ab). Similarly, the edge from
ub to ua is (ub, ua, α
−1
i , t
α−1i
ba ). Note that t
αi
ab is only known to ua and t
α−1i
ba is only
known to ub, and these two values can be different. We regulate that every trust
value is in the interval [0, 1], the bigger the value is, more trust it represents.
We additionally introduce two new operators 〈αi〉→tφ and 〈αi〉←tφ into the user
formula φ and their semantics are defined as follows.
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉→tφ iff ∃ ub ∈ U s.t. (ua, ub) ∈ αi, tαiab ≥ t and
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ua, τ  〈αi〉←tφ iff ∃ ub ∈ U s.t. (ub, ua) ∈ α−1i , tα
−1
i
ba ≥ t and
Γ,∆, ρ, %, ub, τ  φ
When the requester is regulated to be linked with the owner through user rela-
tionships, trust can be put into the formula. Now for the policy of Scenario 0,
Eve can specify the formula as below:
#own〈friend〉→0.83 req.
To get an illegal access with the above formula, a malicious user needs to become
friends with three users that Eve trusts (t ≥ 0.8). Note that the way we integrate
trust value into the user formula is simple. There exist other methods, such as
trust value can be evaluated on a whole relationship path. How to extend our
logic to support complicated trust requirements is part of our future work.
Reliability of PG. Different from users’ information, public information are
imported from external databases and they are not operated by real users. For
example, Paris’s information in Facebook is taken from Wikipedia and the fact
that it is in France can be extracted from public geography database. Therefore,
reliability of public information are guaranteed by these external sources – for
instance, the reliability of Wikipedia pages and their connections can be ensured
by a community effort and users’ reputation [41].
Reliability of ρ and %. Some public information result in user relationships,
for example, users who went to the same school are ‘schoolmates’ or work in the
same company are ‘colleagues’. If the link between the qualified requester and
this kind of public information are exploited by a policy, then the owner who
defines this policy can add the connection originated by the public information
between the qualified requester and other users into the formula as well. In this
way, these other users can be treated as endorsing the connection between the
requester and the public information. In Scenario 3 of Section 6, besides working
in the rival company, Charlie regulates that the qualified requester should have a
certain number, e.g., 3, of colleagues who work in this rival company. Moreover,
he can also add trust to the formula. The policy is defined as follows.
#own(〈friend〉→0.8req ∧ (〈rival〉Hy  (req ∧ 〈colleague〉←0.73  y))).
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(co-)owner Policy formula φ Qualified users
Alice #own〈friend〉req Frank, Charlie
Bob #own〈friend〉req Eve
Gabriele #ownd〈friend〉ereq Eve, Danny
Table 1: (Co-)owners with their policies and users who can access the resource.
Now, in order to gain the access, the malicious user has to be trusted by Charlie
(t ≥ 0.8) and be colleagues with three other users who work in that company.
Also, these three colleagues’ trust value on the requester have to be at least 0.7.
Clearly, it is much harder for the adversary to succeed.
For policies exploiting public information that cannot result in user rela-
tionships, endorsement (as well as trust) cannot be applied. For example, in
Scenario 1 of Section 6, the qualified requester needs to be linked to a loca-
tion, while in Scenario 2 Bob and the requester are connected through charities.
Similar to public information, the reliability of the links between some of these
public information and users also depends on external services. For example, in
Facebook, a user is treated as having been to one location if he used to publish
a status or photo labeled with that location. This location label is provided
by ISP (Internet Service Provider) or GPS services. A user’s connection to a
charity can be certified by the charity, as the user normally gets tax benefit for
his donations. Again, we do not focus on the reliability of external services.
10. Collaborative Access Control
So far, we have assumed that the resource’s access control policy can be only
defined by its owner. However, as introduced in Section 5, a resource can be
affiliated with several users, e.g., a photo tagged with several users, and each
of them should have the right to decide who can access the resource. This is
the so-called collaborative access control. In this section, we aim to extend our
model to support collaborative access control.
We first name all the users who are affiliated with a resource and are not
the owner as the co-owners of the resource. We further use the set O(r) to
represent a resource r’s owner and co-owners. If one co-owner of a resource
wants to define a policy to allow only his friends of friends to view the resource,
then the policy formula is specified as #own〈friend〉〈friend〉req. For simplicity,
we still use variable own in the formula to refer to one of the co-owners in O(r).
With multiple policies on a resource, access control conflicts can happen
when deciding whether granting the access to a certain user or not. Informally,
a conflict means a user can access the resource under one policy but is forbidden
by another. For example, in the user graph depicted in Figure 2, suppose that
Alice publishes a photo and tags her friends Bob and Gabriele in it. Here, Alice
is the owner while Bob and Gabriele are the co-owners of the photo. We assume
that Alice and Bob only allow their friends to view this photo and Gabriele
wants users who are at least his friends to view it (see Section 8). Their policy
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formulas as well as users who can access the photo, namely qualified users, are
listed in Table 1. There are several access control conflicts. For example, Eve
can access the resource under Bob and Gabriele’s policies but she is forbidden
by Alice. Note that the owner and co-owners of resource can always access the
resource, and they are not included in the qualified users of each policy.
To formalize access control conflicts, we first define the set of qualified users
of a policy as the following.
Definition 2. Given an access control policy φ that is defined by a user u
on a resource r, i.e., u ∈ O(r), its set of qualified requesters is QU(φ) =
{u′ | Γ,∆, ρ, %, u, τ [own 7→ u, req 7→ u′]  φ ∧ u′ /∈ O(r)}.
Then, the conflict on accessing a resource is defined as
Definition 3. Given a resource with the set of access control policies defined
on it, denoted by Φ. An access control conflict happens if there exists u ∈ QU(φ)
for a policy φ ∈ Φ such that u /∈ QU(φ′) for another policy φ′ ∈ Φ.
Several works have been proposed to resolve conflicts caused by collaborative
access control (see Section 2 for a short introduction), we can apply some of
them within our scheme. For instance, Hu et al. [35] proposed a few solutions
for resolving access control conflicts. In their work, the so-called naive solution
is to only allow the common users in the sets of qualified requesters to access the
resource. In the example of Table 1, no one except for the co-owners can view
the photo. This shows that the naive solution is too restrictive. In addition,
more sophisticated solutions based on voting schemes are proposed by Hu et
al. [35] and others [32].
So far, we have considered conflicts at the requester level, i.e., conflicts hap-
pen when different co-owners allow different users to access the resource. In [34],
Sun et al. considered conflicts at a policy level and proposed an approach for
resolving conflicts by combining trust relations in OSNs and preferential voting
schemes. Under their consideration, a conflict happens when co-owners’ policies
are different. In Figure 2, following the example in this section, Alice, Bob and
Gabriele co-own a photo. Since the policies listed in Table 1 from them are
different, a policy-level conflict happens. The solutions to resolve the requester-
level conflicts can be naturally exploited to resolve the policy-level ones. For
instance, one naive solution would be: only the owner’s policy is enforced on
controlling the photo’s access. In this case, Gabirele’s policy is ignored.
We notice that, in some cases, there are no policy-level conflicts but requester-
level ones. For example, in Table 1, Alice and Bob have the identical pol-
icy, thus there is no policy-level conflict between them. On the other hand,
as we discussed before, their policies still cause requester-level conflicts. In
some other cases, there may be no requester-level conflicts but policy-level
ones. For instance, suppose that in Figure 2 Alice and Charlie are tagged
in a same photo when they watched a Tennis game at school several years
ago. Charlie wants to share this photo with his friends who like sports, i.e.,#own〈friend〉(req ∧ bSportsc). In Figure 2, except for Alice, only Danny is
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[10] [13] [21] This paper
Multi-relationship type X X X X
User attributes X X X
Public information X
Trust X X
User-resource relation X
Relationship depth X X X X
Topology-based policy X X
Policy propagation X X
Table 2: Comparison of access control schemes for OSNs.
qualified. Alice, however, only wants to share this photo with her schoolmates,
In Figure 2, only Danny can view the photo under Alice’s policy. There is
no conflict at the requester-level since the only qualified requester is Danny.
However, Alice and Charlie’s policies are obviously different which results in
a policy-level conflict. The relationship between these two types of conflicts
deserves further investigations, we leave it as a future work.
11. Comparison
In this section, we compare our scheme with relationship-based access control
schemes in the literature [10, 13, 21] (see Table 2).
The model of OSNs in [10] is the same as our user graph UG, but public
information are not treated as entities in the model. As a consequence, access
control policies only make use of users’ social representations. On the other
hand, it seems possible to express connections between users and public infor-
mation through propositions in [10]. For example, a proposition IsinParis can
be used to express the connection between a user and city Paris. However,
as mentioned in Section 6, each user will be affiliated with a large amount of
attributes which is neither ideal or practical. Moreover, policies that explore
relationships between public information (see examples in Section 6), cannot be
captured by propositions.
The work proposed in [13] does not explicitly take into account public infor-
mation and their relationships. However, this work has two interesting features.
First, in the OSN model, users’ resources are treated as independent entities.
Relationships between users and resources are not restricted only to ownership,
e.g., the relationship between a user and a photo that he is tagged in is modeled
as ‘photoOf’ in their language. Thus, collaborative access control is possible
in their model. Second, due to the fact that OSNs are modeled with semantic
web technologies, hierarchy information among users’ relationships are natu-
rally supported as well as actions and resources, which make policy propagation
possible. For example, if a user defines a policy to regulate the qualified re-
quester to be his friends, then users who are in a closer relationship, such as
‘good friend’, with him are also qualified. In our work, we show how to perform
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policy propagation based on a model of relationship hierarchy in our access con-
trol scheme (see in Section 8). In addition, we used semantic relations among
the public information in Section 7 to facilitate users to express their policies
concisely.
Similarly, the scheme in [21] does not take into account public information
neither. In this model, attributes of users are not represented. Moreover, their
policy language seems weaker than ours – negation symbol only works with
relationship paths, but not on nodes. Hence, policies such as “all my friends
but Alice can view my photo” cannot be expressed. On the other hand, this
work has some its own features. First, the OSN model treats resources as nodes
which is similar to the one in [13], and actions that users performed on their
resources are recognized as relationships. For example, a user can regulate that
only users who used to comment on a same photo as he did is able to poke
him. To support this in our access control model, we need to extend the social
network model and treat users’ resources as nodes as well. Second, the authors
propose a simple solution through administrative policies for collaborative access
control. To achieve this in our model, we need to add a decision module in the
model checking algorithm.
We also notice that the two schemes [13, 21] can possibly treat public infor-
mation as users’ resources, i.e., modeled as nodes in their OSN model. However,
as we explained previously in Section 4, public information are extracted often
from external databases, and relationships among them are different from the
ones between users. In our work, we apply the separation of concerns principle
to model public information and their relationships separately from users and
their social links.
12. Discussion
We have shown that our scheme and its extensions can express fine-grained
access control policies related to users and public information. We have also
shown how to deal with the problem of information reliability in OSNs by in-
corporating endorsement and trust into our policy formulas. There are still two
other issues to discuss.
The first question is about the usability of our scheme, especially for the non-
experienced users – whether a user can easily express a policy of his intention.
On one hand, relationship-based policies (e.g., friends, friends of friends) can be
easily expressed in our scheme like the current access control schemes adopted by
OSNs. On the other hand, a group of qualified requesters under a sophisticated
policy can be computed by OSNs, e.g., a Facebook user can directly get a
list of his friends who have been worked in a company through Graph Search.
Besides, as shown in Figure 1, Facebook already implemented smart list for
users to define fine-grained policies. Therefore, we believe that our scheme can
be supported as well. Moreover, users can use visualization tools (e.g., see [42])
to learn whether their policies have been properly enforced.
The second is related to the availability of user information in OSNs. As
privacy raises serious concerns in OSNs, users might not be willing to share too
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much information. As a consequence, some eligible users can be filtered out by
a policy due to the lack of their information in the OSN. However, the main
purpose of OSNs is for people to express themselves and socialize with other
users – more information a user shares, more benefits he will gain from the OSN.
On the contrary, a user keeps more privacy if he shares less information. There
is always a balance between information sharing (or utility) and privacy. What
we focus in this paper is to explore the information shared by users in OSNs
to express fine-grained access control policies. Thus, we consider availability of
user information in OSNs orthogonal to our proposal.
13. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have first identified a new type of access control policies
that are meaningful but have never been addressed in the literature. Namely,
users in OSNs can express access control requirements not only based on their
social relations but also on their connections through public information. Then
we defined an OSN model containing users and public information, based on
which we proposed a hybrid logic to define access control policies. We gave a
number of policies based on public information and formulated them formally
and precisely in our proposed logic. We further used category relations among
public information and relationship hierarchy to extend our logic and make it
more practical. In addition, we also showed how to extend our model and logic
to deal with unreliable information and collaborative access control in OSNs.
In the future, besides studying the relationship between requester-level and
policy-level conflicts related to collaborative access control framework (see Sec-
tion 10), we plan to improve the expressiveness of our model by integrating user
resources [13, 21]. As resources are different from users, modeling resources
explicitly may address more expressive policies. The connections between re-
sources and public information will be interesting to study as well. Secondly,
we plan to develop a Facebook App to support our access control models. This
App should guide users to use public information within Facebook to express
their intentions on control their resources’ access. The main feature of this App
is to give users a way to organize their friends into different lists or groups by
exploring different public information. Besides, a visualization tool, similar to
the one of Anwar and Fong [20], will be developed as part of the App to help
users to find and evaluate who else in Facebook can access his resources under
his policies.
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